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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
J. SEAL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- VS -
LESLIE LEFEVRE, ET AL., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11307 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the purported assignee of Harold 
A. Ranquist to recover fees the assignor claimed were 
owed to him, under an implied contract, by individual 
holders of Bureau of Land Management grazing permits. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff (R. 26) and Defendants (R. 12) each moved 
for a Summary Judgment. The Defendants' Motion 
was granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
D(•fendants moved for a Summary Judgment with 
Affidavits, (partially countered by Plaintiff) Interroga-
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tories and Demands for Admission. The facts not eff Pc-
tively contradicted by the Plaintiff are as follows: 
Mr. Ranquist was working on a Bureau of Land 
Management grazing dispute for clients - the Chyno-
weths - who had retained him under an express con-
tract (R. 18, 27). There was never any express contract 
between the Defendants and Mr. Ranquist, Plaintiff's 
assignor (R. 18). 
One of Mr. Ranquist's clients was a Mr. Jack Chyno-
weth who also acted as chairman of a cattlemen's associa-
tion or a committee of grazers. There is no allegation 
that any of the Defendants were members of any associa-
tion or particularly the association which Jack Chyno-
weth purported to represent. Mr. Chynoweth invited 
all permittees in Eastern Kane and Garfield Counties to 
attend a meeting (R. 28), giving notice to these grazers 
that problems critical to their permits would be dealt 
with. The Defendants were not aware of any particular 
dispute they had with the Bureau of Land Management 
as, in Mr. Ranquist's words (R. 29): 
Each of the Defendants [in this case] were ad-
vised in several written communications of the 
existence of the problems and how they effected 
each permittee in the entire district. They were 
invited to participate in the meetings that were to 
be held to achieve a solution to these problems 
* * * 
Most of the Defendants did not attend any meetings 
(R. 69, 70). 
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At the time of these communications from Mr. 
Ranquist and the meetings which he held there were 
proceedings pending contesting certain action of the 
Bureau of Land Management but the only parties named 
were Mr. Ranquist's contractual clients (R. 60, 61). 
Mr. Ranquist and his retainer client, Mr. Chynoweth, 
sent a card under the name of Mr. Chynoweth as chair-
man of an association asking the cattlemen to note their 
acceptance of a contract to retain the service of Mr. 
Ranqnist (R. 72 and card attached to R. 54). This card 
purported to be to members of an association although 
there is neither an allegation or a showing that any of 
Defendants were members of that association or any 
group represented by Mr. Chynoweth. 1 None of the De-
fendants returned the card (R. 48 and 87). 
All of Mr. Ranquist's services were necessarily per-
formed under his retainer for the Chynoweths. He re-
ported the conclusion of the disputes as follows: 
A settlement has been reached in the Chynoweth 
cases (R. 58, 66). 
The committee which Mr. Chynoweth claimed to 
(/..) 
represent invited all these Defendants to attend~ meet-
ing to formulate agreemeniswith the BLM (R. 58). None 
of the Defendants attended (R. 18-25). 
'Mr. Ranquist later sought to join as. additional defe~dants ~o 
cattlemen's associations (R. 78-81), one m Kane and one m Garfield 
County. These defendants are all residents of Garfield County (R.1). 
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Mr. Ranquist in his affidavit states that Mr. Chyno-
\Veth agreed to collect his fees as dues from members 
of the association ( R. 28, 84). 
The Defendants do not know of any benefit they may 
have received as a result of the conclusion reached by 
Mr. Ranquist in his representation of the Chynoweth 
clients (R. 19, et seq.) and if any benefit were receivrd 
it could only have been as a precedent. 
Undoubtedly some of the Defendants, because of the 
slight amount claimed, paid Mr. Ranquist. He filed 
actions against two groups, those in Kane County (R. 31, 
32; 73, 74) and those in Garfield County (R. 1). 
Some of the Defendants filed answers pro se (R. 9, 
10, and 11). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AN ATTORNEY CANNOT RECOVER LE-
GAL FEES FOR BEING INSTRUMENTAL 
IN ESTABLISHING A BENEFICIAL PREC-
EDENT. 
We are unable to find a case in which it has been 
held that benefits which flow from a favorable legal 
precedent require payment, by those who may receive 
beneficial results by application of the precedent, of 
fees for its establishment. 
Mr. Ranquist apparently believed in good faith that 
all the cattlemen had a problem with the Bureau of Land 
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ManagPment common to that one he was controverting 
for his clients, the Chynoweths. Sensing this, he and 
Mr. Chynoweth assessed an arbitrarily established fee 
on all cattlemen who held a government permit and Mr. 
Chynoweth agreed, as an officer of his association, to 
collect it (R. 28). 
Nothing in the files shows that any of these De-
fendants were ever made parties to any proceeding or 
contest before the Bureau of Land Management (R. 60, 
Gl). 
That Mr. Ranquist's efforts, if they benefited these 
Defendants at all, served only the office of a precedent 
is established by an ex parte memorandum, which Mr. 
Ranquist circulated to all of those whom he claimed 
owed a portion of his fee, referring to a meeting he had 
held with BLM officials (R. 62-65). In setting out an 
agreed statement of policy, Mr. Ranquist states (R. 63, 
subpara. A2) : 
The program for placing this policy into effect 
will be adopted first with the Chynoweth Brothers 
in connection with their appeal and then by each 
of the other permittees in the District. 
At page 64 of the record beginning with the third 
paragraph Mr. Ranquist states: 
This policy will be applied first to the Chynoweth 
Brothers then to McKay Bailey, and then to each 
and every permittee whose application was not 
made out in strict accordance with the provisions 
of [applicable BLM regulations]. 
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An attorney cannot legally claim compensation for 
incidental benefits and advantages to one flowing to the 
latter on account of services rendered to another by 
whom the attorney may have been employed (7 CJS 1041, 
Attorney and Client, Section 175). Where no additional 
services by the attorney are contemplated in the agree-
ment for additional fees, it is ordinarily held without 
consideration and invalid (7 CJS Page 1052, Attorney 
and Client, Section 181). 
In Volume 7 Am Jur2d, Page 166, Attorneys at Law, 
Section 205, it is stated: 
The mere fact that the services an attorney ren-
ders for his client are beneficial to other parties 
does not entitle the attorney to recover any com-
pensation from those benefited nor is the client 
who engaged the attorney and paid his fees en-
titled to recover a proportionate share of the 
attornev's fees from those who recE~ived a benefit 
from the services. To escape liability the bene-
fited parties need not inform the attorney that 
they deny liability. 
1Ne respectfully urge that the Judgment of the trial 
court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
By Ken Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Respondents 
